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Abstract – The policy of subsidizing petroleum derivatives in Tunisia distorts the real prices of 
goods and services. It does not take care on environment. There is no serious fiscal policies to 
reduce pollution generated by energy products. 
The calculation of the correlation matrix between different macroeconomic aggregates does not 
give a negative effect of oil prices on national GDP. However, this result is serious, because the 
impact on economic (performance) is hidden, affecting first the general level of prices, 
unemployment and inflation. Instability of oil prices has no apparent impact. This fact and 
instability make many difficulties to manage prices and inflation after revolution. Impact on  GDP 
passes through Economic Vulnerability Indicator (EVI) and agricultural sector. 
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I. Introduction 
A large number of studies have investigated the 
direct and hidden impact of oil prices on economies. Most 
studies have adopted VAR models to capture crud price 
impact on groups of countries. These researches have 
been able to calculate the effects of energy through 
elasticities. However, a (reduced) number of studies have 
calculated the hidden effects of fuel volatility with 
subsidy policies without consideration of negative 
externalities on environment  
This paper tries to capture the effects of crude oil price 
volatility on an economy that subsidizes petroleum 
derivatives and has not a clear environmental policy. We 
try to answer the following question: what are the (direct) 
and hidden impacts of oil volatility on the Tunisian 
economy? 
Tunisia produces, export crude oil and import petroleum 
derivatives (diesel, gasoline, kerosene). Oil shocks and 
price increases in the world market. It has impacts on the 
macroeconomic aggregates of Tunisia and on the 
Tunisian social welfare. These impacts are indirect for the 
Tunisian case. Indeed, in this paper, we show that the 
number of days in which the price of crude increases has 
not a negative effect on the national GDP and the 
correlation is low and positive. However, the effect of 
fuel prices is significant on the other macroeconomic 
aggregates as inflation. 
The high volatility of fuel prices makes the Tunisian 
economy more vulnerable through the agricultural sector. 
We explain this idea by introducing the variable EVI that 
measures the vulnerability of the Tunisian economy. 
 
 
 
This paper aims to detect the hidden and apparent effects 
of energy on the Tunisian economy given the institutional  
change of 2011 and the political change. We organize this 
into five sections: 
With the first one, we develop the concept of Oil shocks 
via the supply and demand curves shifts. Second, we 
analyze Economic Growth and oil shocks. The Third 
section develops the Welfare hidden Impact of oil prices. 
Forth, we give attention to the macroeconomic 
transmission channels of oil price shocks. In the last 
section we analyses the case study of Tunisia and we 
conclude.  
 
II. Oil shocks: the supply and  demand 
curves shifts   
We can define an oil shock by a large modification in 
oil prices, in the international market, and the supply. 
These variations may occur slowly and gradually or 
abruptly and unexpectedly. Petroleum, as a substantial 
source of energy, affects energy prices directly. When the 
price of the crude increases in the world market, energy 
prices rise and vice versa, even with subsides policies. 
Moreover, when the price of oil increases, the demand for 
other sources of energy indirectly increase; in such a case, 
the price of other competitor sources which would be 
supplied as a new source of energy, will rise. 
Consequently, an oil price shock is more generally an 
energy and agricultural sector price shock, and an energy 
and agricultural crisis are directly influenced by an oil 
crisis.  
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Three oil shocks or energy shocks occurred in 1973 
and in 1990 (Iraq and NATO war). As it is clear, the 
reason for these three main oil shocks was supply 
disruption.  
The oil price shocks of the 1970s can be explained by 
pure supply factors, but starting from the 1980s oil price 
increasingly began to come under another pressure from 
its demand side. It accelerated from about US$35/barrel 
in 1981 to beyond US$120/barrel in 2013. At the same 
time federal interest rates decreased from 16.7 percent per 
year to about 0.1 percent. Taghizadeh and Yoshino (2015) 
explain how this long-term price increase was, in most 
cases, caused by expansionary monetary policies that 
heightened oil prices through interest rate channels, and 
so the change rate. For the case of developing country, 
inflation has an energy dimension (imported inflation) 
according to banking interest rates. Aggressive monetary 
policies stimulated oil demand and blew up the oil price. 
Consequently there will be slower economic growth. This 
means that there are also many demand factors that affect 
consumption of oil. 
This idea can be more expressed using the aggregate 
supply and demand model, which explains   economic 
fluctuations in the short run.  We can show, via the 
aggregate and supply curve, that an oil shock do not cause 
only shift on the supply curve but on the demand curve 
simultaneously. Consequently, production and the general 
level of price will change. We can explicit this idea as 
follows: 
If an oil price shock shifts the general level of prices by 
increasing production costs, it decreases the components 
of total demand such as real national consumption, real 
investment expenditure, real government expenditure, and 
the real transport cost of exports and imports. Therefore, 
the real value of national expenditure decreases du to 
inflation. If the relative increase in the imported oil price 
exceeds the relative rise of exported goods, then a deficit 
will occur in the trade balance or the net exports of a 
country(X-M). Consequently, the federal real gained 
income of energy consumers will fall. Therefore, their 
demand for goods and services decreases. Such a decrease 
in demand will cause the demand curve to fall. This 
occurs mostly in industrial countries, which happen to 
also be the major importers of oil. The final result can be: 
a reduction on the production or the GDP, with a price 
level that can be the same as initially (before the oil 
shock) or lower, if we suppose a passive, or no change, in 
the monetary and fiscal policies) 
 
III. Economic Growth and oil shocks  
 
In addition to labor and capital, energy is also 
considered as factor of production. Therefore, production 
would be a function of labor, capital and energy. 
                                 (1) 
Where, Q measure the GDP, K measure the stock of 
capital, L the stock of labor, and the stock for energy is E. 
Therefore, any change on the quantity of Labor, Capital 
or Energy leads to the alteration of levels of production.  
 
 
Furthermore, there are direct relationships between the 
use of such elements and the level of production. In other  
words, a rise (decrease) of each of the foregoing elements 
leads to an increase (decrease) in production. In the above  
function, a positive variation of: K, L and E leads to a 
positive modification of Q.  
In addition, utilization of energy from different sources 
such as oil, gas, coal and electricity, is itself a reverse 
function of the price level of energy sources. In other 
words, an increase in energy prices lead to a fall in energy 
as input in the production function, which in turn results 
in a decrease in production.  
 
With, for oil price,  for gas price, for coal price and 
for electric price. 
Energy considered as a factor of production that has a 
down turn demand curve relatively to price of energy. 
Consequently, partial derivative between E and each price 
is negative.  
An increase in oil price may lead to the substitution of oil 
by other sources of energy. Therefore, as it is a 
production factor, it will have short-term effects on the 
increase of production costs and will lead to the reduction 
of real production of oil importer countries. In the long 
run too, it leads to a rise in costs; the rate of which will 
depend on the ability of other sources to replace oil. If 
ability to substitute exists, such price increases will have 
no important effect on costs. To show the primary and 
secondary effects of alteration of energy prices, we can 
deduct energy costs from gross product to determine net 
product as follows: 
 
The net product is y and E is the amount of energy used to 
monetary product Q and  represent price index of 
energy.  
 
IV. Welfare  hidden Impact of oil Prices 
 
The bulk of petroleum is consumed indirectly 
through household consumption of other goods and 
services that use petroleum products as inputs. Therefore, 
the welfare effect of higher oil prices and lower subsidies 
on household real incomes is as two form: 
- direct effect of higher prices for petroleum products 
consumed by households 
- indirect effect arising from higher prices for other 
goods and services, using energy or petroleum as 
input in their production process. So, these higher 
prices will be passed indirectly to households. 
Calculating the direct effect or hidden effect, and how it is 
distributed across income groups, essentially requires 
information on the level of direct consumption of various 
petroleum products (gasoline, diesel, and liquefied 
petroleum gas) or the budget share expenditure of 
households across the national income distribution. The 
main source of information is typically a household 
survey containing expenditures by each household on 
individual oil products. A “first-order” measures the 
direct real income effect of oil price and can be calculated  
 
L. Jebali et al. 
IJECA-ISSN: 2543-3717. June 2018                                                                                                                         Page 26 
 
 
as follows:  - For each household we calculate the budget 
share of fuel expenditure items, i.e., fuel expenditures 
divided by total household consumption. Multiplying 
budget shares by the percentage increase in price due to 
the increase in fuel prices gives a first-order estimate of 
the real income effect of the price rise, which assumes 
that fuel consumption stays fixed. We assume that there is 
a total pass-through of pricing. This means, that the 
increase of energy prices on the supply cost are directly 
transmitted to consumers and there is no subsidies from 
the government. This overestimates the real income effect 
since, in practice, households can reduce this impact by 
substituting away from fuel.  
The incidence of the real-income effect can be analyzed 
by examining how the magnitude of the effect varies 
across the income distribution. Typically, household per 
capita consumption, possibly adjusted for family 
composition, is taken as the best proxy of household 
welfare.  
We can then analyze the hidden incidence of the real 
income effect by calculating the average percentage real 
income loss. If the percentage real income loss is higher 
(lower) for low-income households, then the incidence is 
said to be regressive (progressive). Recent studies showed 
that the greatest budget share of the poorest households 
are devoted for fuel. Therefore, the increase of price of 
this type of energy, has a great impact on poor 
households. 
Put differently, the budget share gives a first-order 
approximation of the welfare impact of price change, or 
the amount of money required to maintain unchanged the 
utility level of the household. 
For a given product, the share of spending on that product 
in total expenditure corresponds to the price elasticity of 
real income or total spending assuming the volume of 
demand constant. Put differently, the budget share gives a 
first-order approximation of the welfare impact of price 
change, or the amount of money required to maintain 
unchanged the utility level of the household. 
 
where y is the level of income or expenditure,  is the 
share of spending on good i in total expenditure and,  is 
the price of good i. 
For instance, if diesel account for 10 percent of total 
spending of a household, the direct effect of a 10 percent 
increase in diesel price would be a 1 percent decline in 
household real income or a corresponding increase in 
household real expenditure. Since households can 
consume energy products or goods as gasoline, fuel, 
diesel, the overall direct effect is the sum of the direct 
effect associated with each fuel product. 
 
Where m is the total number of goods directly depend to 
energy products (gasoline, fuel, diesel).  
 
Identifying the magnitude of the hidden indirect effect 
requires an estimate of the effect of higher fuel costs on  
 
the prices of other goods and services consumed by 
households. These price effects can be estimated using an 
input-output table of the economy showing the energy 
intensity of each sector and a simple model of the effect 
of higher fuel costs on prices. As with the direct effect, 
the indirect real-income effect can be calculated by 
multiplying the budget shares of the various goods and 
services by the estimated percentage price increases in 
these sectors. The incidence of the indirect effect can be 
determined by estimating the effect separately for 
households across the national income distribution.  
 
We have n-m as the number of non-fuel products. With n 
is the number of goods produced using energy as inputs. 
The total real income effect is calculated as the sum of the 
direct and indirect real income effects, and the incidence 
can also be determined by calculating the average effect 
for households in different parts of the income 
distribution. In practice, reflecting the high proportion of 
fuel consumed in the production and distribution of goods 
and services, the indirect effect accounts for over half of 
the total effect. 
 
V. Macroeconomic transmission channels 
of oil price shocks 
 
The several researchers have supported the view that the 
countries with stronger trade relationships have similar 
business cycles. For instance, we can state that the shocks 
that occur in one country can be transmitted to all sectors 
in that country spatially to agricultural sector. In addition, 
oil price shocks can be transmitted to another country if 
they have intensive trade linkages. According to the 
reference [15] the hidden effects of oil price were 
significant at the case of integrated  
countries. The results of the study suggested that, it is 
quite advantageous for the industrial countries to trade 
with the developing countries, due to the high growth 
capacity of developing countries. On the other hand, the 
developing economies gain from trading with the 
industrial countries because of the higher relative income 
levels in the industrial countries. To explain our idea, we 
present the study by Tilak Abeysinghe and Kristin Forbes 
(2005) that used a structural VAR model and 11 Asian 
countries, also confirmed the fact that trade linkages is 
very significant aspect in case of transmitting the effects 
of shocks occurred in one country to its main trading 
partners. For developing countries in which agricultural 
sector has a great part of the national GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product), oil price shocks are directly and 
indirectly transmitted to social welfare through 
agricultural goods.   
 
Oil price changes are almost generally accepted as a 
significant factor that affects different economies of oil-
exporting and oil-importing countries. According to the 
study by Weiqi Tang, Libo Wu and Zhong Xiang Zhang 
(2009) there are several channels through which oil prices  
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affect an economy and macroeconomic variables: interest 
rate, output and investment. According to the theory oil 
prices affect the macroeconomic variables through these 
six transmission channels: 1) supply-side shock effect; 2) 
inflation effect; 3) real balance effect; 4) the unexpected 
(uncertainty) effect. 
Supply-side shock effect – From this perspective oil is 
described as direct input of production process. When 
local and national oil price increases it automatically 
affects the output through the rising production costs. 
Consequently, a lower productivity decreases the total 
output and increases the unemployment. This 
transmission process scenario is typical for an oil-
importing country. For an oil-exporting economy higher 
revenues as a result of the oil price shocks can contribute 
the increases in investment opportunities, which will 
boost the output and decrease the unemployment. 
Inflation effect – Oil price shocks also trigger the inflation 
in economy. The prices of agricultural goods will 
increase.  As it was mentioned, oil price shocks increase 
the costs of production, which is considered as a price 
shock therefore. For developing countries, oil prices 
shocks make the economy more vulnerable due to the 
great part agricultural sector. This vulnerability calculated 
according to EVI indicator1.  
Real balance effect – Through this transmission channel, 
an oil price shock impacts money demand. As an 
example, consumers tend to borrow and not to save, it 
increases the interest rates and decreases the demand for 
cash. 
The unexpected (uncertainty) effect – The investment 
demand of both consumers and producers is affected 
through the uncertainty channel of an oil price shock. The 
future investment plans can be postponed if people do not 
know if the oil prices will go up or down. After that, the 
uncertainty causes the Investment demand to decrease. 
 
VI. Hidden impact of oil price volatilities: 
the case of Tunisia 
 
In this section, we resume a limited works done on 
the effects of oil price shocks on oil importing and oil 
dependent economies such Tunisia. The most important 
and significant research related to the effects of oil price 
shocks on economic activity and macroeconomic 
variables was done through the example of the US by 
[12]. In his papers, they showed that there is a strong 
relationship between oil price changes and economic 
growth of 11 Asian and OECD countries. In other words, 
an essential negative correlation between the oil price 
increases and the economic recessions in some countries 
was determined. Another not less significant aspect of oil 
price increases is that oil supply interruptions is a good 
prediction tool for GDP decrease, hence, it can cause the 
economic slowdowns. However, after the later research 
by [7], it was stated that there was a negative correlation 
in the case of oil price decreases and national GDP for the 
United States of America case.  
                                                        
 
 
Another interesting [9] studied the correlation path 
between the oil price shocks and economic growth during 
the period of 1982-2008 in Greece, which is a highly oil 
dependent country. Accordiong this study, the oil 
consumption was 64% of the total energy consumption in 
Greece in 2006. A statistic approach with time series 
equation were used to examine the relationship and 
possible asymmetries between oil prices and economic 
activity. The results stated that more than 3% month to 
month increases in oil prices and oil price volatility more 
than 2.4% during a year negatively affect the economic 
activity in Greece. 
 
VII. Statistical approach and database 
 
To start the statistical development of direct and indirect 
impact on economy let us see the tendencies of oil prices 
over time from the 90th to 2015. Next graphic (figure 1) 
shows this evolution:  
 
 
Figure 1. Annual modification of crude oil prices was done day 
by day from 1987 to 2017.  
 
Thus, if we measure the daily growth rate of oil prices, 
and the number of positive and negative growth each 
year, we can represent figure 2’ as follow:  
 
 
Figure 1. The number of positive and negative growth each year 
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With NCRUD_plus is the number of days in which we 
have growth of oil prices, and NCRUD_ is the number of 
days in which we have negative growth oil prices.  
The net result of the number of modification days is 
positive. The number of days in which we have growth of 
oil prices is more than the number of days with negative 
growth. Figure 1’’ shows this result:  
 
 
Figure 1. The number of days in which we have growth of oil 
prices is more than the number of days with negative growth 
 
According to Tunisian indicators: annual GDP in national 
currency converted to U.S. dollars and annual real growth 
rate, we can represent figure 2 and figure 3 using INS 
database.  
 
 
Figure 2. Annual GDP in national currency converted to U.S. 
dollars and annual real growth rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Annual GDP in national currency converted to U.S. 
dollars and annual real growth rate using INS database. 
 
Using descriptive analysis we cannot easily see that there 
is direct and significant dependence between the tendency 
of oil prices and growth rates of national GDP in Tunisia. 
We add that Tunisia is one of developing countries which 
subsidies energy products. Therefore, oil or energy choc 
are not transmitted directly to domestic prices. However, 
the choc is transmitted via a more budget deficit.  In 
addition, we can represent figure 4 in order to explain 
how Tunisian GDP vary according to petroleum prices. In 
figure 4, we represent the tendency of Tunisian national 
investment per GDP (NID_NGDP2) and national saving 
over time. We can see that there is a gap from 2010 until 
now between NID_NGDP and (national domestic saving 
per GDP) NGSD_NGDP.  
 
Figure 4. The tendency of Tunisian national investment per 
GDP (NID_NGDP) and national saving over time 
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In order to detect the direct and indirect effects of oil 
prices on the social welfare, we adopt a descriptive 
statistical method and the estimation of time series 
equations. This method differs from the approaches of 
IMF studies using a-theoretical approaches under VAR 
models. 
Our approach differs radically from IMF studies that aim 
to detect impacts through VAR modeling because in 
Tunisia the price system does not reflect production costs 
due to the fuel subsidy policy. Tunisia is the start point of 
the Arab Spring. There has been a restructuring of the 
institutional and political system from a presidential 
regime to another hybrid regime supported by the 
international financial institutions including the IMF. The 
latter institution has encouraged all policies to reduce 
petroleum subsidies adopted by governments. 
Consequently, the Tunisian government has adopted a 
policy of automatic correction of fuel prices.  
The database used is World Bank data and International 
Energy Statistics (IES) during the period 1980-2020. The 
values of 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020 are estimates by the 
World Bank. Missing data are estimated by moving 
average. 
We introduce in this paper the variable EVI, which 
measures economic vulnerability according to the FERDI 
database. The EVI is the simple arithmetic average of 2 
sub-indexes3: 
The exposure sub-index, which is a weighted average of 
5 component indexes: population size (25%), remoteness 
from world markets (25%), exports concentration 
(12.5%), share of agriculture, forestry and fishery in GDP 
(12.5%) and the share of population living in low elevated 
coastal zone (25%). 
The shocks sub-index, which is a weighted average of 3 
component indexes: the victims of natural disasters 
(25%), the instability in the agricultural production 
(25%), and the instability in exports of goods and services 
(50%). 
Components are built on different kinds of primary data 
(number, percent, index), which are normalized through a 
min-max procedure, to get component indices ranging 
from 0 to 100, with high scores corresponding to a high 
level of vulnerability.  The sum of components’ weights 
equals 1 so that the EVI is also lying between 0 and 100. 
 
The variable X measures the share of agriculture in the 
national GDP according to the FERDI database. Y 
measures the number of days in which an increase in 
crude oil prices from IES database. The variable NGDPD 
is the current GDP in dollars. PCPI is the general index of 
consumer prices. LUR is a measure of unemployment rate 
according to the World Bank. BCA is the current balance 
account, according to the World Bank database. 
By calculating the correlation coefficient between 
different variables, we provide the following matrix:  
 
 
 
                                                        
 
 
Table1: correlation matrix 
 
NGDPD Y X PCPI EVI BCA LUR
NGDPD  1.000000  0.369781 -0.884368  0.958629 -0.801204 -0.703016 -0.391848
Y  0.369781  1.000000 -0.541596  0.400977 -0.314260 -0.097818 -0.311239
X -0.884368 -0.541596  1.000000 -0.900987  0.698300  0.500775  0.417394
PCPI  0.958629  0.400977 -0.900987  1.000000 -0.826433 -0.729118 -0.302252
EVI -0.801204 -0.314260  0.698300 -0.826433  1.000000  0.922689 -0.090466
BCA -0.703016 -0.097818  0.500775 -0.729118  0.922689  1.000000 -0.248040
LUR -0.391848 -0.311239  0.417394 -0.302252 -0.090466 -0.248040  1.000000
 
According to this matrix, there is a strong correlation 
between GDP and all variables. However, the upward 
movements of oil price days (Y) positively modify the 
Tunisian GDP measured in current US dollars. At the 
same time, we note that the variable Y is negatively 
correlated with the economic vulnerability index (EVI). Y 
Has no remarkable effect on the current balance of 
payments (BCA). Upward movements of oil price days 
(Y) is creator of inflation and he is not creator of 
unemployment. 
It seems paradoxical that Y generates growth by positive 
co-rotation between Y and NGDPD, bit it is normal to 
find a negative correlation between energy price 
measurement (Y) and the share of agriculture in national 
GDP (X). This result seems logical for a country like 
Tunisia, which is a producer of crude oil and importer of 
petroleum derivatives. The upward movements in Brent 
crude oil prices affect positively the national GDP 
through other hidden channels: it is an indirect impact of 
oil on the Tunisian economy. 
From the remarks of the correlation matrix, the following 
regressions estimated by OLS can be provided and give-
hidden measurement of the impact of oil prices to 
macroeconomic variables: 
 
Table 2: impact of oil prices on vulnerability, National GDP and 
inflation 
  
Equation 1 
log(EVI) 
Equation 2 
log(NGDPD) 
Equation 3 
Log(PCPI) 
log(Y(-1)) 0.089506   0.284842 
ar(1) 1.103476     
c  3.012979 11.81396 3.368298 
log(EVI(-
1))   -2.709354   
ma(1)     0.841762 
R2 0.903996 0.500136 0.864299 
F statistc 94.16206 22.01198 82.79918 
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NB. All parameters are elasticities. They are statistically 
significant at a risk of 1%. The three equations are 
globally significant according to the Fisher criterion. 
The linear equations 1, 2 and 3 prove the results of the 
correlation matrix. A 1% increase in oil prices makes the 
Tunisian economy more vulnerable. This vulnerability 
negatively affects current national GDP growth. A 1% 
increase in economic vulnerability translates into a 2.7% 
drop in economic growth. According to Equation 1, a 1% 
increase in oil prices generates 0.285% inflation. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
The volatility of fuel prices has serious impacts on 
the Tunisian economies because they are not direct. The 
impact on social welfare and economic growth is indirect. 
It is apparent on consumer prices by making the Tunisian 
economy more vulnerable. The effect of international fuel 
prices and volatility are more severe for Tunisia and will 
only be apparent over the long term, through the negative 
impact to the balance of payments (current account) and 
the rise in prices by damaging the agricultural sector. The 
hidden negative impact of crude oil prices on national 
GDP is serious because in Tunisia there is an energy 
subsidy policy that distorts the precise calculation of the 
production costs of goods and services. To remedy this 
problem, the IMF (International Monetary Fund) proposes 
to the Tunisian authority to review the subsidy policy and 
to adopt a pollution control policy and (the efficiency 
price system). 
 
 
References 
 
[1] D. Coady, M. El-Said, R. Gillingham, K. Kpodar, P. 
Medas, and D. Newhouse,The Magnitude and Distribution 
of Fuel Subsidies: Evidence from Bolivia, Ghana, Jordan, 
Mali, and Sri Lanka, IMF working paper, wp 06/247, 2006.  
[2] E. Papapetrou, Oil price asymmetric shocks and economic 
activity: the case of Greece, University of Athens, 
Department of Economics, Athens, Greece and Bank of 
Greece, Economic Research Department, 2009.  
[3] F. Fabrizio, A. Goumilevski, and K. Kpodar, A New Tool 
for Distributional Incidence Analysis: An Application to 
Fuel Subsidy Reform, IMF working paper, 2015.  
[4] F. Taghizadeh-Hesary, N. Naoyuki Yoshino, 
Macroeconomic Effects of Oil Price Fluctuations on 
Emerging and Developed Economies in a Model 
Incorporating Monetary Variables. ADBI Working paper 
series, working paper N°546, 2015.  
[5] FH. Taghizadeh, N. Yoshino, G. Abdoli, and A. 
Farzinvash,”An Estimation of the Impact of Oil Shocks on 
Crude Oil Exporting Economies and Their Trade Partners”, 
IMF working paper, 2013.  
[6] HC . Bjørnland, Oil price shocks and stock market booms 
in an oil exporting country, working papers from Norges 
Bank N°16, 2008.  
[7] HG. Huntington, Oil Shocks and Real US Income, Energy 
Modeling Forum Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305-
4026, 2007.  
 
 
 
[8] J. De Haan, R. Inklaar, R. Jong-A-Pin, Will business cycles 
in the euro area converge? A critical survey of empirical 
research, Journal of Economic Surveys Vol. 22, No. 2, 
2013, pp. 234–273. 
[9] M. Balcilar, The Impact of Oil Price on South African GDP 
Growth: A Bayesian Markov Switching-VAR Analysis, 
University of Pretoria Department of Economics Working 
Paper Series, 2014.  
[10] M. Closset, S. Feindouno, and M. Goujon,  Human Assets 
Index Retrospective series: 2013 updat, Working paper 
fondation pour les études et recherches sur le 
développement international.  
[11] R. Jiménez-Rodríguez, M. Sánchez, Oil price shocks and 
real GDP growth empirical evidence for some OECD 
countries, European Central bank, Working Paper Series, 
N°362, 2004.  
[12] T. Abeysinghe K. Forbes, Trade Linkages and Output-
Multiplier Effects: a Structural VAR Approach with a 
Focus on Asia, Review of International Economics, 13(2), 
356–375, 2005. 
[13] T. Abeysinghe, Estimation of direct and indirect impact of 
oil price on growth, Economics Letters 73, 2001, pp 147–
153. 
[14] T. Clements, H. Rainey, et al, An evaluation of the 
effectiveness of a direct payment for biodiversity 
conservation: The Bird Nest Protection Program in the 
Northern Plains of Cambodia, biological conservation 
N°157, 2013, pp 50-59.  
[15] V. Arora, A. Vamvakidis, Asia and Pacific Department and 
Strategy, Policy, and Review Department China’s 
Economic Growth: International Spillovers, IMF Working 
paper N°165, 2010. 
[16] W. Tang, L. Wu, and ZX, Zhang, Oil price shocks and their 
short- and long-term effects on the Chinese economy, 
Energy economics 2010. doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2010.01.002.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
